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BUILDING SOCIAL NORMS ON THE INTERNET
Daniel B. Levin
This Note examines how architecture, and
particularly the design and coding of software on the
Internet, helps shape social norms. The Note makes two
points about architecture and norms. First,
architectural decisions affect what norms evolve and
how they evolve. By allowing or facilitating certain
types of behavior and preventing others, architecture
can promote the growth of norms. On the flip side,
architecture not tailored to promote certain positive
norms of cooperation or compliance with the wishes of
the designer (or in some cases the law) may allow the
growth of antisocial norms. Second, because design
decisions affect behavior directly as well as indirectly
through norms, software engineers must recognize the
regulatory function of the code they create. Although
online architecture can promote productive social
norms, design decisions can also create a backlash by
fostering the development of norms that work against
the sort of behavior the code is written to promote.
The Note begins by describing how architecture
works to regulate behavior in the physical world,
examines the leading theories of social norm
development, and explores the intersection of
architecture and norms. The latter part of the Note
transposes the general theory of architecture and norms
to the Internet world, first describing the particular
features of the Internet-anonymity, dispersion, and
the free flow of information-that make the process of
norm development different in cyberspace than in
physical space, and then turning to two examples,
online auctions and digital music, to show how
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software engineers have effectively and ineffectively used
code to promote the development of social norms.
INTRODUCTION
Law schools, for obvious reasons, lavish attention on law as
a regulator of behavior. Since the 1960s and the emergence of
the law and economics movement, however, many law scholars
have come to regard the basic rules of markets outlined in
microeconomic theory as an equal or perhaps more important
influence on human behavior than the public law of states or
the private law made by individuals. Even more recently, many
have come to recognize that non-legal, non-market rules
defined broadly under the rubric of social norms also
profoundly affect human behavior. Receiving far less attention
in legal analysis are the physical constraints that limit human
behavior-the architecture of the world.1
Lawrence Lessig, in his book Code and Other Laws of
Cyberspace,2 outlines the four modalities of regulation-law,
markets, norms, and architecture. Law, as he describes,
regulates behavior through commands of the form: If you do X
(or fail to do X), you will incur penalty Y. Markets create
incentives for people to behave in particular ways. Social norms
threaten non-legal sanctions for certain behaviors. And, finally,
architecture constrains the set of possible behaviors.
Lessig's argument focuses particularly on the architecture of
cyberspace: the computer code that turns electrons,
semiconductors, and miles of wire and cable into the Internet.
Throughout his work, he repeatedly hammers home the point
that in cyberspace, code is law.3 Lessig does not mean that the
laws of states or contractual agreements lack meaning in
cyberspace, but that the decisions of programmers about
1 Professor Neal Katyal's recent work addresses how physical architecture can serve
as a tool of crime control. Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE
L.J. 1039 (2002).
2 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).
'E.g., id. at 6.
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software design set the rules of the game. Just as the decisions
of road planners and bridge builders control where you drive
your car and where you cross the river, the decisions of
software programmers determine how you receive and send e-
mail, view web pages, or conduct business in cyberspace.
This Note examines how the architecture of cyberspace
works to influence the development of norms. Generally
speaking, when legal scholars refer to social norms they are
referring to informal social rules that individuals adhere to
because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of
external non-legal sanctions, or both.4 Lessig's influential
insight is that the programmers writing the code that runs the
Internet have become lawgivers-setting the rules of
permissible behavior on the Internet.5 Neal Katyal has recently
made a similar argument about the power of architecture in
physical space to influence behavior and prevent crime.6 Both
authors recognize that laws can shape architectural decisions,
whether in cyberspace7 or physical space.8 That is, while direct
legal regulation of behavior can be one tool, legal regulation of
architecture, which in turn shapes behavior, is another tool.
This Note examines another two-step process: how
architecture, in particular the design and coding of software on
the Internet, helps to shape social norms. This Note makes
twopoints about architecture and norms. First, architectural
decisions affect what norms evolve and how they evolve. By
allowing or facilitating certain types of behavior and preventing
others, architecture can promote the growth of norms. On the
flip side, architecture not tailored to promote certain positive
norms of cooperation or compliance with the wishes of the
4 Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REv. 338, 340 (1997).
5 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 5-6. Lessig recognizes that architecture can operate at a
level of indirection, affecting law, markets, and norms. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the
Horse, What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARv. L. REv. 501, 511 (1999). This Note
explores how software engineers can and do use code to influence the creation of norms
in practice.
6 Katyal, supra note 1.
7 See LESSIG, supra note 2, at 90-95;
'See Katyal, supra note 1, at 1090-9 1.
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designer (or in some cases the law) may allow the growth of
antisocial norms. Second, because design decisions affect
behavior directly as well as indirectly through norms, software
engineers must recognize the regulatory function of the code
they create. Although online architecture can promote
productive social norms, design decisions can also create a
backlash by fostering the development of norms that work
against the sort of behavior the code is written to promote.
Part I of this Note describes how architecture works to
regulate behavior in the physical world and examines the
leading theories of social norm development. The last Section
of this Part explores the intersection of architecture and norms.
In Part II, I transpose the general theory of architecture and
norms to the Internet world, first describing the particular
features of the Internet that make the process of norm
development different in cyberspace than in physical space. I
then turn to two examples, online auctions and digital music, to
show how software engineers have effectively and ineffectively
used code to promote the development of social norms.
I. ARCHITECTURE AND NORMS
A. Understanding Architecture
Architecture can regulate behavior by itself. Once installed,
bars over windows prevent entry without the continuing
intervention of other individuals. Laws require police officers,
prosecutors, and courts; norms require social sanctions imposed
by individuals or groups. Architecture, however, once in place,
constrains behavior without reliance on ex-post enforcement by
others. This does not mean architecture is absolute. Some is, of
course; bars may be cut and locks picked, but we cannot travel
at light speed.9 Some architecture may not even be intended to
constrain absolutely. A two-foot wall around a public plaza
channels foot traffic to specific entrances and exits, but anyone
can step over the wall.1" The unifying theme of architecture is
9 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 236.
10 See Katyal, supra note 1, at 1058-62.
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that it works in the moment. If you circumvent the architecture,
other regulators may constrain your behavior but the
architecture will not. If you pick the lock on your neighbor's
front door, laws against burglary may still constrain you, as will
norms of neighborliness, but not the architectural constraint.11
Architecture acts as an automatic buffer, but once breached, it
ceases to operate as a constraint. 12 In addition to being
temporally distinct from other forms of regulation (in that its
effects do not generally extend beyond its breach), architecture
differs from those other forms of regulation in its agency
requirements. Architecture may require an agent as a builder,
but no agent enforces its commands. The checks of the built
environment or the code of the Internet, once in place, work
automatically.13
This model captures the essential regulatory elements of
architecture, but architecture does not operate in a vacuum.
Operating by itself, architecture makes for a blunt tool but like
legal regulation, which can affect what is built or how markets
function, architecture too can work at a level of indirection. In
particular, it can powerfully influence the development of
norms. Before exploring this relationship, however, I briefly
examine different theories of how social norms themselves
develop. Then I turn to how architecture can influence the
development of norms.
B. Understanding Social Norms
Understanding how architecture affects norms requires first
an understanding of how norms develop. Scholars have
suggested many theories of norm development, but have failed
to reach any convincing consensus-most likely because norms
emerge in many and varied ways in many different contexts.
This Section outlines several of the leading theories of norm
development. The final Section of this Part explores several
11 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 236-37.
12 Id. Markets can also impose these kinds of ex ante restraints. For instance, you
generally must pay first before acquiring goods.
13 Id. at 237. Of course, architecture does not emerge autonomously; markets,
norms, and law all influence builders (whether of physical architecture or of code).
2001-2002
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examples of how architectural decisions affect norm
development.
Norms evolve in many settings and contexts and no single
theory is capable of explaining all observed norms. The
following sections begin with the classic problem of
cooperation between two parties and examine, even absent
legal incentives, the reasons people might choose cooperative
strategies. I then turn to examine esteem-based theories of
norms. Finally, I briefly discuss how social meanings can affect
the formation of norms.
1. The Problem of Cooperation
Rational choice theorists proceed on the assumption that
people act in rational ways to maximize utility over a
reasonably small set of preferences. Put more bluntly-people
are wealth-seeking and act rationally to meet that objective.
Rational choice in law, typified by the law and economics
movement, has not shied away from using social norms as a
tool to explain behavior. Unsurprisingly, economics-based
theories of norms fit norms within the standard assumptions of
law and economics.
In his foundational book, The Evolution of Cooperation,
Robert Axelrod addresses the question of why people, who tend
to look out selfishly for their own best interests, choose in some
circumstances to cooperate with one another.14 The problem of
cooperation can be represented by the famous prisoner's
dilemma game. In a simple prisoner's dilemma, two actors may
either cooperate or defect and fail to cooperate. The result of
the classic prisoner's dilemma is that if the game is played just
once both parties defect-the worst possible outcome.
The prisoner's dilemma paradigm can be used to describe
basic human interactions in any number of settings-for
instance, when two people engage in a commercial transaction
as buyer and seller. Assuming a fair price exists at which the
seller would part with the item and the buyer would want the
14 ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
D. LEVIN
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item, i" there will be a gain from trade. However, if the seller
misrepresents the value of the item or fails to complete the
exchange after receiving payment, she will gain more from the
trade. Likewise if the buyer takes the item and never makes the
payment he will gain more from the trade. If the two plan to
make simply one trade, there is little incentive for them to be
straight with one another. However, if the buyer and seller are
repeat players engaging in multiple transactions it will serve
them well to find a way out of the dilemma and cooperate.
Of course, one way out the prisoner's dilemma is law. Law
can change the payoff structure for players in the game.16
Impose criminal sanctions for fraud and the seller in a
commercial transaction will become less likely to misrepresent
the value of the item for sale. Likewise, theft and fraud laws
will prevent a buyer from taking the item without paying or
passing a bad check. But law is not the only way out of the
dilemma. Laws are costly and difficult to enforce, and many
real world interactions are in practice out of the reach of the
law, either because the players are ignorant of the application of
the laws or choose not to use them.
17
A cottage industry has attempted to explain how individuals
in the world find ways out of the dilemma without resort to law
by examining when and why individuals engaged in repeated
prisoner's dilemma situations cooperate. In the next two
Sections, I will examine two different models, each deriving, at
least in part, from Axelrod's work. These models try to explain
how non-legal mechanisms, or social norms, can work to
promote cooperation.
2. Reciprocity and Trust
In his study of cooperation, Axelrod discovered that the
most effective strategy in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game
was "tit for tat." The "tit for tat" strategy involves a player
cooperating on the first move of an iterated prisoner's dilemma
15 That is, the buyer's willingness to pay meets or exceeds the seller's willingness to
accept.
16 See AXELROD, supra note 14, at 11.
17 See generally, ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991).
2001-2002
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and in every subsequent round doing whatever the other player
did on the previous move."8 "Tit for tat" is a strategy of
reciprocity. If the other player cooperates, "tit for tat"
cooperates; if the other player defects, "tit for tat" defects. If the
other player defects tens times in a row, "tit for tat" will defect
ten times in a row, but if on the eleventh move the other player
finally cooperates, on the following move, "tit for tat" will
reciprocate and cooperate.
Axelrod argued that reciprocity would emerge in the long
run when conditions allowed two players, through trial and
error, to learn about the possibilities for mutual reward. "The
foundation of cooperation," Axelrod wrote, "is not really trust,
but the durability of the relationship."19 What matters is not the
ability of the two players to trust one another, but whether the
relationship will be able to endure a period of errors, until the
two players come to recognize the mutual advantages that may
be gained from cooperation.2" As long as the relationship has
durability, reciprocal cooperation can and will emerge.
Moving beyond the groundwork laid by Axelrod, scholars
have recently begun to thicken the theory of cooperation in
collective action settings by looking at problems with a high risk
of defection through the lens of trust.21 The challenge has been
to expand beyond the rational-choice model of collective action
worked out by Mancur Olson22 and the two-player prisoner's
dilemma game used by Axelrod, and examine how, in
collective action settings, players can reach a state of reciprocal
cooperation. According to this theory, individuals in collective
actions settings cooperate when they trust that others will
cooperate.
The new theory of collective action posits that when people
perceive that others are behaving cooperatively and
18 AXELROD, supra note 14, at 13.
19 Id. at 182.
20 Id.
21 E.g., Symposium, Trust Relationships, 81 B.U. L. REV. 321 (2001).
22 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) (arguing that
individuals will not act to promote a collective good, but will attempt to free ride on the
contributions of others to that collective good).
D. LEVIN
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contributing to some public good, then individuals will
themselves contribute to the public good without the need for
external motivation.23 Conversely, when individuals perceive
that others are shirking and failing to contribute, then they too
will shirk. In short, the more people trust that others will
cooperate, the more they will cooperate. 24 Those who distrust
that their fellow citizens will cooperate are likely to shy away
from contributing to a public good themselves. Moreover, both
these situations are self-reinforcing. The more individuals
cooperate and contribute to a public good, the more a norm of
cooperation will emerge; and others will be inclined to follow.
If individuals defect, a norm of selfish failure to cooperate will
develop; and individuals will be even less likely to want to
contribute in this atmosphere of distrust.
One example of evidence for the trust model comes from
observations of tax compliance. If we assume that people act to
maximize their own self-interest, then we would expect people
to try to evade taxes. Under traditional logic, external sanctions
against tax cheating prevent widespread evasion of the tax laws.
Yet compliance varies from region to region in a manner
uncorrelated with expected penalties for cheating. Dan Kahan
suggests that these variations can best be understood through a
reciprocity model. The compliance rates, he argues, can be
explained by the compliance climate of the community. When
individuals believe that others are paying their taxes, and
therefore contributing to the public good by filling the public
coffers, then they too will pay. When it seems that many are
defecting and evading taxes, they will defect and try to cheat as
well. 25 In fact, external sanctions can be self-defeating. Highly
publicized auditing campaigns have actually provoked higher
rates of non-compliance, 26 as the public attention raises public
23 Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REv. 333, 334
(2001).
24 id.
25 Id. at 340-44.
26 Stephen M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire?
Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 193,
211-13 (Joel Slemrod, ed. 1992).
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awareness of cheating and encourages individuals to
reciprocate by cheating themselves.27 Thus, if the sense of trust
and reciprocity evaporates, a norm of compliance can break
down.2"
3. Signaling
Social structures influence the evolution of cooperation. In
particular, a player's reputation affects whether others will want
to cooperate with him. To the extent that a player can project
her good reputation to others, her ability to engage in mutually
beneficial cooperation increases. In his recent book, Law and
Social Norms, Eric Posner attempts to explain how individuals
can signal their good reputations. Observed behavioral norms,
Posner argues, are the result of individuals signaling their
reputations in order to achieve cooperative relationships. 29
Social norms, he claims, are endogenous; they are the label we
attach to this signaling behavior.3" Posner argues that the
explanation for non-legal cooperation begins with the
observation that people who defect in a prisoner's dilemma
situation suffer an injury to their reputations.31 If you have a
bad reputation, people will not want to cooperate with you in
the future. Rational choice theory predicts that people who
would fail to cooperate in a single prisoner's dilemma game
will cooperate if the game is repeated. Thus, for repeat players,
27 Kahan, supra note 23, at 341-42.
28 Another example of the trust model at work comes from a study at an Israeli
daycare center. Two researchers demonstrated that the imposition of a fine on parents
who arrived late to pick up their children did not decrease the incidence of lateness. In
fact, lateness increased after the fine was imposed. Even more strikingly, after the fine
was removed parents continued to pick up their children late at approximately the same
high rate as when the fine was in place. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). Although the authors conjecture that the imposition of a fine
effectively set a price for lateness that was previously ambiguous, Kahan argues that the
persistence of lateness after the removal of the fine was due to a break down in trust.
Kahan, supra note 23, at 339-40.
29 ERiC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRMs 8 (2000). Nobel Laureate Michael
Spence did important work about the idea of signaling in markets in the 1970s. E.g.,
MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING (1973); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87
Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973).
30 Id. at 34.
31 Id. at 15. See infra Esteem Theory of Norm Formation, Subsection I.B.4.
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there is an incentive to signal that they value future
cooperation. Posner argues that people want to have some way
to show others that they will cooperate in collective action
settings and want to be able to find others with whom to
cooperate. Signaling their willingness to cooperate allows
people to avoid the potential defectors. Social norms result
from this signaling behavior.
There are two ways in which signaling can result in social
norms. First, people can engage in costly actions, for example
gift giving or shunning people with certain characteristics to
signal that they value future payoffs. These actions (costly in
terms of the effort or money required to engage in them)
become the standard practice (the norm) for those who want to
be seen as good candidates for repeat interactions. Second,
when people engage in cheap actions, their deviation from the
norm will be punished by others who seek to signal their
"goodness" by taking the costly action of shunning the people
who act in unusual ways.32 This is the enforcement of the social
norm by those who want to signal their attractiveness as good
repeat players. People do not have to intend for an action to be
a signal for it to be perceived as a signal, as long as people
understand certain behaviors, such as gift giving, as a signal
that someone values future interactions.33 A social norm is
nothing more or less than the behavior that emerges from those
signaling mechanisms. People may eventually internalize these
behaviors, but that alone cannot explain why people adopt
norms.34 Although Posner focuses on gifts as the predominant
form of signaling behavior, he argues that essentially all
behavioral regularities (at least in broadly defined transactional
settings) are the result of signals people use to show they are
"good."
32 Id. at 25.
"3 Id. at 26-27.
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4. Esteem Theory of Norm Formation
Axelrod explains cooperation within a rational choice
framework, and Posner explains norms within a similarly
narrow framework. Richard McAdams offers a theory of social
norms that, while still based on the rational choice assumption
that people act to maximize utility, utilizes a richer conception
of preferences than Posner's theory. According to McAdams,
norms arise because people derive some independent utility
from having good reputations, and thus both value and seek the
esteem of others.35
The condition for maintenance of a norm is relatively
straightforward: "A norm exists as long as the sanctions
imposed on violators of the norm create an expected cost for
noncompliance that exceeds the expected cost for
compliance., 36 The sanctions McAdams has in mind are
decentralized, but this sort of nongovernmental enforcement
presents a second-order collective action problem. That is,
individuals will not take costly steps to enforce a norm unless
their contribution is the marginal contribution that prevents the
discouraged behavior. The solution to this collective action
problem is for people to punish norm violators without cost by
withholding the esteem they seek.37
McAdams posits that the initial force behind norm creation
is an individual desire for respect and prestige. 3' Three
conditions, however, must be satisfied before a norm can
develop. First, consensus must exist about the positive or
negative esteem- worthiness of engaging in a particular
behavior. 3 Consensus, of course, may develop around either
35 McAdams, supra note 4.36 
Id. at 352.
371 Id. at 364.
381 Id. at 342.
39 A difference exists between a behavioral regularity and a consensus. A behavioral
regularity may exist in a community without a norm. McAdams illustrates the point with
the example of smoking. For instance, most people may refrain from smoking, but there
may be no norm against it. Once a consensus opinion against smoking becomes well-
known, it creates cost for smokers in terms of lost respect and prestige of their
compatriots. McAdams's insight is that these esteem costs have a positive feedback
effect. One person's decision to refrain from smoking has the externality of raising the
D. LEVIN
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good or bad behavior-behaviors that society on the whole
wants to encourage or discourage. The second condition is that
there must be some inherent risk of detection. Because the
theory hinges on the low cost of enforcement, in order for a
norm to develop around behavior X, a risk must exist that any
individual who engages in X will be discovered without anyone
bearing the cost of discovery.
Finally, conditions one and two must be widely known-
this constitutes a third condition McAdams calls publicity.
Within the relevant community of people, both the existence of
consensus about the desirability of behavior X and the inherent
risk of detection must be well known.4 ° According to
McAdams, esteem-based norms develop when, for most
individuals, the cost in terms of lost esteem of not following the
consensus outweighs the actual cost of doing so, and thus most
individuals take the less costly route of adhering to the
consensus. 41
5. Social Meaning
Social norm discussions generally focus on behavioral
regularities. Some scholars have added another dimension to
this discussion by addressing the social meanings of various
behaviors.42 Social meaning theory attempts to add a layer of
complexity to behavior-focused norms, and to point out the
limitations in simply addressing behavioral regularities without
looking at the broader social context. 43 As Lessig puts it:
cost for others who smoke. That is, the fewer people who follow the norm the more of a
pariah a deviant becomes. McAdams argues that individuals value esteem relatively.
Thus, the fewer people who engage in a behavior X the more it negatively distinguishes
individuals who do X, making X more costly. See McAdams, supra note 4, at 404-07.40 
Id. at 358.
41 Id. at 364.
42 E.g. Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv.
2181 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903
(1996).
43 Just what defines a social meaning has been the subject of some debate. To begin
with there is a question of whether it denotes an actor's intended meaning or rather the
message received by those who perceive another's act. Robert Ellickson has attempted to
introduce a clarifying label "social reception" for the latter concept but it does not seem
to have stuck. Generally when commentators refer to the social meaning of an action they
2001-2002
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"Norm-talk is behavior focused. It asks what a community
does. It shares with its frugal father economics the desire to just
observe behavior, without the need to understand it. The
perspective is external, and from this external perspective, it
describes prices, or costs associated with deviating from this
regularity. Ordinary behavior is thought to be cheapest;
deviance costly."44
Incorporating the idea of social meaning into a discussion of
social norms offers both descriptive and prescriptive utility.
From a descriptive standpoint, understanding the context in
which a behavior occurs and the meaning of the behavior in
that context will help clarify the social cost or benefit of the
behavior. Meaning talk incorporates the expressive nature of
the action-that is, it takes account of both the act and the
context.
By helping us contextualize behavior and understand that
actions carry social meaning, expressive theories can lead to
richer descriptions of social norms. But the real benefit,
according to proponents of a social meaning approach, is that
meaning-centered accounts of norms offer a mechanism to
change norms as well as a lens through which to observe them.
Once again, Lessig champions the utility of this approach:
When one is norm-focused, the idea of
changing a social norm appears extremely
difficult. The rhetoric is always about "evolving
customs" and the slow rate of behavioral change.
The picture is one of exhorting a group to act
differently, and the sense is always of some blob
that must be pushed from all sides if it is to be
moved at all.45
When one focuses on meanings, one is not trapped in a slow
evolutionary framework. Understanding the meanings of
use the term in the outward looking sense. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics
Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 549 (1996).
44 Lessig, supra note 42, at 2182-83.
45 Lessig, supra note 42, at 2186.
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actions may be the key to understanding how to change
behavior.
Most social norm theories suggest that actions carry social
costs or benefits. If part of that cost or benefit is tied into not
just the act itself, but the contextualized meaning of that act,
and meanings can be malleable, this presents an avenue to
change the cost or benefit of a particular behavior. For
example, fines have an ambiguous social meaning. They can be
seen both as a punishment and a price.46 The former meaning
may do more to deter crime than the latter. Dan Kahan has
suggested that by tying fines to sanctions with clear meaning,
for instance short prison terms or shaming penalties, the state
could clarify the meaning of fines as a form of punishment.
Fines, of course, are a far less expensive form of punishment
than incarceration, and thus potentially a more efficient form of
deterrence and retribution (assuming that fines carry a
retributive meaning) than prison.47
C. The Perverse and Complementary Relationship Between
Architecture and Norms
Architecture and norms each work to constrain behavior.
So far we have viewed them independently, but this is a
mistake as they do not function so. The simplest way to
conceptualize the relationship between architecture and norms
is to understand architecture as defining the universe of possible
behavior. Within the boundaries set by the architecture, norms
(as well as law and markets) will regulate which behaviors
predominate. Your neighbor's backyard may be easily
accessible from the street, but even though architecture allows
you to enter the backyard, certain norms against nosiness and
invasiveness prevent most people from venturing into others'
backyards (the laws of trespass may operate as well).
But this is still too simple. Architecture does more than just
define the universe of possible actions. Architecture can
46 Id. at 2187; Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 28.
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facilitate and encourage certain behaviors. A low fence may not
keep a determined trespasser out of a backyard, but it may deter
trespassers by sending a message about the wishes of the
property owner or the acceptable sphere of behavior in the
neighborhood.4" Not every course of action possible within any
architecture is equally easy to accomplish. In particular,
architecture can facilitate or encourage behaviors that
encourage norm formation. For example, signaling may be
more or less effective depending on physical constraints. If
physical boundaries make it difficult to send and receive gifts
for instance or to know from whom the gift came, then
individuals are less likely to attempt to signal their intention to
be cooperative players.49 Or, in the case of trust networks,
transparency or lack of transparency is critically important.0
Architecture can foster the formation of bad norms for all
the same reasons that it can aid the formation of positive
norms. Behavior must be visible in order for people to earn
esteem (in other words, if no one knows what you are doing,
you can't earn any esteem points). Thus, transparent
architecture, by allowing easy monitoring, can help to promote
esteem-based norms. Opaque architecture can hinder
development of these norms and, to the extent that
transparency allows people to see widespread bad behavior, a
transparent architecture will allow a consensus to develop
around the appropriateness of this bad behavior. Similarly,
transparency may lead to the formation of good or bad trust-
based norms. What matters in the trust model is what people
think others are doing. That is, if everyone is defecting, but
people believe that everyone is cooperating, then a trust model
predicts cooperation. In this case, an architecture of
transparency will hinder the formation of a norm of
cooperation and likely lead to widespread noncompliance. If
everyone is cooperating but people believe that defection is
48 See Katyal, supra note 1, 1058-62 (discussing territoriality); id. at 1083-86
(discussing the social meaning of architecture).
49 See supra Signaling, Subsection I.B.3.
5 0 See supra Esteem Theory of Norm Formation, Subsection I.B.4.
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commonplace, then a transparent architecture will foster a
norm of cooperation.
The most complex possible relationship between
architecture and norms is when the social meaning of the
architecture conveys a message directly contrary to the purpose
of architecture itself. The purpose of bars or boards on windows
is to prevent entry. But, as James Q. Wilson and George
Kelling's broken windows theory suggests, the expressive
meaning of those bars is "I don't trust people" or "I believe this
is a high crime area".51 Boarding up windows will make
criminally entering a building more difficult, but it may add to
the overall crime rate of the neighborhood. The purpose of the
architecture, to reduce crime, is at odds with the effect the
meaning of the architecture has on the norm of law-abidingness
in the neighborhood.
5 2
This is different from the architecture fostering good or bad
norms. Architecture can act as a facilitator of certain behaviors,
or it can make certain preconditions for good norm formation
difficult to attain, but in both these roles the architecture does
not have an independent meaning. Architecture, like action, in
many instances carries a social meaning. This social meaning
can work toward the creation of a norm that endorses precisely
the behavior the architecture itself is designed to restrict.
Of course, the architectural meaning and purpose do not
have to have counter effects. An architectural decision can be
made with its meaning in mind. Both a barbed wire chain link
fence and a decorative brick wall can protect property from
intruders-their architectural purpose is essentially the same.
But the decorative brick wall is more likely to send a social
meaning of wealth or law-abidingness, while the barbed wire
fence may send a message of fear of crime.53 The latter could
negatively affect a norm of compliance of the law in the
neighborhood. When individuals design architecture that will
51 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982.
52 See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES
(1961) (describing the effects of architecture and urban planning on life in cities).
53 See Katyal, supra note 1, at 1084-85.
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regulate behavior, they must bear in mind not only the purpose
of the architecture but its meaning as well.
II. CYBERSPACE
Larry Lessig argues that computer code, the architecture of
cyberspace, works as a powerful regulator of behavior. Lessig,
however, is deeply skeptical about the prospect of a cyberspace
regulated purely by code. He bristles against the possibility of
perfect control over intellectual property, in which authors
through code can control who has access to their works, how
and when they can copy the intellectual property, and even
how often they themselves may view the work.54 Lessig
describes the prospect of "trusted systems," computer systems
that use encryption to control intellectual property rights
online. "[S]ystems would exchange information only with
others that could be trusted, and the protocols of trust would be
built into the architecture of the systems"55
Lessig fears these kinds of trusted systems will erode the
doctrine of fair use in copyright law and the possibility of an
intellectual "commons."56 But he believes that they may
become our future. That is, code has the potential to be a
complete regulator of human behavior. Although trust
networks in the physical world evolve through complicated
non-legal systems, in cyberspace trust can be coded. In physical
space, people may cooperate when they think others cooperate;
in the most extreme vision of cyberspace, people will cooperate
only when the code builds that trust into the environment. With
the code-centric vision, the question becomes how we can
manage code. The central message of the trusted system, which
Lessig and others describes as a potential future for intellectual
property on the web, is that code can govern behavior
completely.
5 7
54 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 127.
55 Id. at 129.
56 Id. at 130, 141.
57 Id. at 130.
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But code cannot carry the regulatory burden alone, even in
cyberspace. As cyberspace has developed, and as I will illustrate
with several examples, regulation in cyberspace has evolved not
simply through clever engineers imposing ironclad rules on
users-coding trust, for instance-but also through clever
engineers using code to influence the development of social
norms of cooperation. To be sure, engineers can in some cases
use code to regulate behavior in cyberspace directly,5" just as
builders can use physical architecture to control behavior.59 But
my claim is that, as in the physical world, Internet code as a
direct regulator of behavior is only the first step. In some cases,
it is simply ineffective;60 in other cases, it is either less effective
or more costly than another technique that calls for using
software design to foster particular norms. Using architecture to
create norms is difficult business. Sometimes designers may be
able to consciously harness design to promote certain
behaviors, but in other cases the effect of the architecture on
norms may be unanticipated or contrary to the designer's
intentions.61 To understand how code can be used not only to
regulate behavior directly but to influence and manage how
cyberspace norms develop, I first examine how particular
features of cyberspace affect norm formation. I then address
through two examples, online auctions and digital music, how
code-design decisions affect the formation and perpetuation of
norms in cyberspace.
A. Norms in Cyberspace
Within the world of legal scholarship, a debate has
percolated over the validity of studying cyberspace. Judge
Easterbrook has likened the law of cyberspace to the law of the
5' Lessig's strong claim is that code is a hyper-effective regulator (and that its
writers are largely unregulated and commerce-driven). Id. at 6.
59 See Katyal, supra note 1.
60 See infra notes 101-108 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty of using
encryption technology to protect against unauthorized copying of digital music files).
61 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (describing how architecture and
norms can have contrary effects).
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horse. 62 And perhaps as the ubiquity of the Internet has spread
over the last half decade, the argument for Internet
exceptionalism has shrunk. The Internet may be just another
revolutionary technological innovation like the telephone, and
maybe there should not be a separate law of cyberspace any
more than a separate law of the horse. In some respects this is
no doubt true, and increasingly so as the Internet has ceased to
be a separate community of like-minded computer aficionados
and has become a tool for the general population. But
cyberspace differs in several critical way from terra firma, and
these differences have a profound effect on the formation and
maintenance of norms. Most importantly, to a far greater
degree than in the physical world, cyberspace can foster
anonymity.63 Secondly, while the traditional notion of a
community contemplates people living or working or
interacting in close proximity, in cyberspace members of a
community may live and work at great distance from each
other and may share no interactions outside of the Internet.
Finally, information in cyberspace flows more quickly, more
widely, and at lower cost than information transmitted by other
means. These three features-anonymity, dispersion, and
information flow-influence how norms develop in cyberspace.
1. Anonymity
Anonymity exists at several levels in cyberspace. Complete
anonymity hides all meaningful information about the Internet
user from all other users. When the University of Chicago
began to offer Internet service, it granted access to users in a
completely anonymous fashion. Anybody with a computer and
an Ethernet connection could plug into any jack located across
62 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207. The point is that while there are many cases involving horses studied in
law school, there is no law of the horse.
63 See Ian C. Ballon, The Law of the Internet: Developing a Framework for Making
New Law, 2 CYBERSPACE LAWYER 63 (1998); April Mara Major, Norm Origin and
Development in Cyberspace: Models of Cybernorm Evolution, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 97
(2000). The Internet is a venue for anonymity in the traditional sense of a lack of personal
identification, but it can also in certain contexts promote nonanonymity. See infra note
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the university and obtain access to the Internet. Network
administrators at the university had no information about the
user.64 Lessig uses the example to show the repercussions of an
architecture decision by university network administrators and
the difficulty of rule or legal regulation of a network inhabited
by completely anonymous users. However, this form of
completely anonymous access to or use of the Internet is
shrinking. In general, obtaining Internet access from
universities, corporations, or commercial Internet service
providers requires disclosure of a good deal of personal
information.6" Very few users roam the Internet in total
anonymity.
Breaches of anonymity also occur at a higher level of
interaction than Internet access providers. Many web sites
require some form of registration to gain admission. A user
may be able to provide false information to protect her true
identity, but she will lose the complete veil of anonymity. Many
web sites also track visitors by placing a "cookie," a small file,
on the user's hard drive. The cookie allows the website owner
to keep track of when the user visits the site.66
Complete anonymity may be nearing extinction in
cyberspace," yet a more important form of anonymity persists
in cyberspace-pseudonymity. While a user's true identity may
be safely ensconced in the database of the Internet service
provider, this information is not easily available to most people
with whom a user interacts online, because most users adopt
pseudonyms for various tasks in cyberspace. E-mail constitutes
an obvious example. Although some systems assign e-mail
64 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 26.
65 Universities including Yale require users to register their machine with network
administrators before receiving an Ethernet address necessary to access the Internet.
Commercial Internet service providers collect personal information for billing and
marketing purposes. Even free Internet service providers assemble a good deal of
personal information about their users.
66 Web browsers like Internet Explorer allow users to change their settings to decline
cookies. Users who do not adjust the default settings will receive cookies, and some
websites will not function properly if the browser is set to reject cookies.
67 In fact, the ability to keep track of users activities may be one cyberspace's most
invasive features into personal privacy. See LESSIG, supra note 2.
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addresses or aliases based on a user's real name, most
commercial e-mail services allow users to choose an e-mail
pseudonym. Determining the source of an e-mail from
"britney554@aol.com" would be immensely difficult.6" In
addition to e-mail, users may use aliases in chat rooms, mailing
lists, and for registration at e-commerce sites from eBay to the
New York Times online.69
Anonymity is not an inherent feature of cyberspace. Like
many other facets of the Internet, it results from conscious
design decisions in the code of basic Internet protocols, of
Internet service providers, and of websites. This design has
implications for the development of norms online. Social norms
develop when individuals anticipate repeated interactions with
others in the community (whether a close knit community or
not7"). If identities are malleable, communities will be unable to
track individuals and enforce social sanctions on norm violators
(or bestow social benefits on norm compliers).71
If individuals are able repeatedly to assume new identities,
enforcement of social norm obligations will become impossible.
If the code makes Internet pseudonyms difficult to alter, the
problems of anonymity will dissolve to some extent. People
may operate under assumed identities in cyberspace, but as
long as they must continue to operate under the same assumed
identity, and as long as they value being ongoing members of
that community, they will adhere to the obligations imposed by
the norms of the community (AOL, eBay, a USENET
61 Major, supra note 63, at 98.
69 Id. at 99. Information linking the aliases with a true identity is available to courts
or to some people through legal mechanisms (for instance, the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, gives copyright holder the right to ask a court to force the revelation of
the identity of users allegedly infringing a copyright, 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(h)(i) (West
Supp. 2000)) but that does not change the basic fact that for most users in most
interactions an alias provides a good deal of anonymity.
70 Ellickson believes social norms tend to develop and dominate legal controls in
close knit communities. See ELLICKSON, supra note 17. Richard McAdams argues that
esteem-based norms can develop even in much broader communities. See McAdams,
supra note 4.
71 See Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron, 81 B.U. L.
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newsgroup, and so forth). However, to the extent that Internet
norms spill over into the outside world, the anonymity or
pseudonymity available in cyberspace will hinder the formation
and perpetuation of norms. As long as individuals are able to
maintain separate cyberspace personas, the norms of the
Internet are likely to remain indigenous to the 'Net. Internet-
based norms are most likely to spill over into the outside world
when actions online and in the physical world are very similar
and individuals maintain the same personas in both worlds.
2.Dispersion
Anonymity is the result of particular design choices in the
creation of the Internet. The fact that users of the Internet live
in widely dispersed areas is a feature of physical reality.
Different code design could change that feature of the Internet:
designers could have built the Internet or set up basic protocols
only to allow communication between computers in fixed
geographic regions, or more Internet service providers could
provide anonymous access, like the University of Chicago,
instead of regulated access like America Online, without
changing the essential features of the Internet. But a
geographically confined network, although it could be built
(and indeed many businesses build internal networks confined
to a single building or set of buildings), would mean a very
different notion of cyberspace than what we have today.
Dispersion is at once important and irrelevant to norm
formation in cyberspace. On one hand, to the extent that norms
evolve among communities on the Internet itself, the fact that
users may live across the country or across the world from one
another is unimportant. It has become a clich6 to say the
Internet breaks down barriers, but by allowing a widely
dispersed set of people to interact with one another, the Internet
does just that. Scholars debate the extent to which communities
must be closely knit to support strong social norms. For
instance, Ellickson argues that non-legal rules will predominate
only in close knit communities,72 while McAdams contends
72 ELLICKSON, supra note 17.
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that esteem-based norms can act across much broader
communities.73 To the extent, however, that certain norms exist
solely on the Internet, the fact that individuals may physically
reside far from one another makes little difference. Users of
chat rooms participate in the community of that chat room
regardless of where they live. However, if Internet norms reflect
or affect norms in the physical world, the physical separation of
users may impede the development of norms, particularly if the
norms in question depend on tightly knit communities.
Dispersion also reinforces the notion of anonymity online.
Not only may an individual conceal her identity behind a user
name, but others who interact with the individual have no idea
whether the user lives next door or in another state or country.74
"Britney554@aol.com" could be anywhere.
3. Free Flow of Information
The Internet allows information to flow cheaply and quickly
between users. This rapid dissemination of information can
enhance norm formation. Esteem-based norms rely on the
development of consensus about the value of certain behaviors.
The ease of dissemination could enhance the formation of a
consensus, 75 and it may also help to publicize the existence of
consensus. 76 This should lead to a more rapid evolution of
norms on the Internet. Free flow of information, however, is a
double-edged sword. Too much information can obscure a
consensus, make publicization of the consensus difficult, or
prevent detection of deviants whose actions will be lost in the
mass of information.
While some have pointed to the free flow of information as
a linchpin of Internet norm formation,77 the Internet is really
only another incremental step in a long series of technological
innovations that have increased the availability of information,
from the telegraph and telephone to television. Nonetheless, the
73 McAdams, supra note 4.
74 See Ballon, supra note 63, at 65-66.
75 Major, supra note 63, at 102.
76 See McAdams, supra note 4, at 358.
77 See Major, supra note 63, at 103.
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ability to send and receive vast amounts of information cheaply
and easily forms one of the basic contours of the architecture of
the Internet and thus must be reckoned with in any theory of
norm development online.
B. The Internet Community: Norm Formation in Cyberspace
Through Code
This Section looks at two concrete examples of how
architecture and norms interact in cyberspace. The first
example is the online auction site eBay, which uses code design
to facilitate the creation of norms that foster compliance with
contracts. The second case, digital music, serves as an example
of architecture that fails to promote norms of compliance with
copyright law, and, in fact, in the void, fosters norms of
noncompliance.
1. Online Auctions
The architecture of online auction sites fosters the
development of norms of compliance with contracts made
online by allowing users to translate norm creation methods
from the physical world into cyberspace. One of the most
important and pervasive types of social norms are those that
facilitate economic production, including compliance with
contracts.7" The problem confronting software designers is how
to translate such general compliance norms to cyberspace.
eBay, as well as other online auction sites, 79 attempt to solve
this problem through architecture by writing code that
facilitates the kind of communications between individuals that
leads to the development and enforcement of norms.80
78 William K. Jones, A Theory of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545, 545.
79 Most major online auction sites employ design strategies similar to eBay's that
emphasize fostering accountability and community among users. See, e.g., Yahoo, Yahoo
Auctions, at http://auctions.yahoo.com (last visited Mar. 3, 2002); Amazon.com,
Amazon.com Auctions, at http://www.amazon.com/auctions (last visited Mar. 3, 2002).
80 Of course the designers of sites such as eBay do not operate in a vacuum. Code
designers operate under the norms of software engineering and the demands of the
market. But those demands, particularly the market demands, simply call for designing a
site that facilitates successful online auctions. The features employed reflect a decision to
use the design to foster norms of cooperation in transactions.
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Commentators have noted that individuals comply with
contractual obligations even in the absence of formal
mechanisms to enforce agreements and often without reliance
on formal mechanisms when they do exist. 1 Some who suggest
that in the legal realm, little differs between cyberspace and
physical space, 2 might also suggest that norms governing
compliance with agreements apply equally well in cyberspace. I
disagree. Whatever theory or theories of norm development
you adopt, the particular features of Internet communities-
anonymity and dispersion of individuals-make norm
development and enforcement difficult.
Online anonymity frustrates the development of the norms
that emerge when people sense the possibility of long-term
cooperation and have a way of punishing defectors. If there is
no way to track who defects, the problem of cooperation will
revert to a one time prisoner's dilemma problem where the
rational choice is defection. If participants have no idea who
their trading partner is or whether she deserves trust, people
may be unlikely to reciprocate good behavior and an
environment of trust will not develop. 3 Similarly, if individuals
who participate in auctions have no way of accruing esteem,
they will have no incentive to forego short term gains of
defection for the long-term gains in esteem. 4
One model for enforcement would be a code-centric model.
Code designers could build in mechanisms that would allow
only reputable or trustworthy people to trade on eBay. Or they
could build controls into individual transactions that would
prevent fraud (such as requiring escrow payments). 5 However,
81 Jones, supra note 78, at 550.
12 See Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 207 (suggesting that general legal rules apply
equally well to cyberspace and that there is no need to develop a separate legal structure
for cyberspace just as there is no need to develop a separate set of legal rules to govern
things involving horses).
83 See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
5 EBay does offer insurance to buyers for fraud. Transactions are insured against
fraud for up to $200 (minus a $25 deductible). A buyer who proves fraud by a seller for a
$500 item will receive $175. EBay, Fraud Protection Program, at
http://pages.eBay.com/help/community/insurance.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2002). This
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eBay and similar auction sites have addressed the problem of
defection less through code than by trying to incentivize or
encourage good behavior through code design choices that
facilitate norms of cooperation in transactions.
Trading on eBay requires several steps. First a potential user
must register. eBay is a pseudonymous community, so a user
must select a user ID-her eBay identity-and create a profile
for that user ID that includes her real name. eBay has
responded to the problem of pseudonymity in two ways. First,
users can pay $5 to obtain "verified" user IDs. These users
receive a special symbol next to their name, which verifies that
the user is who she says she is and therefore denotes
trustworthiness to potential trading partners.8 6 Second, to
address the problem of malleability, eBay has instituted a
creative solution designed to deter, but not prohibit frequent
changes. Users may change user IDs, but if they do so an icon
of a pair of "shades," dark sunglasses, appear next to the new
user ID for thirty days. 7 This is an example of a code feature of
the site that carries what I have described as architectural
purpose and architectural meaning. The purpose of this code
design is to mark users who change their IDs, "to help you tell
other eBay users about your new look."88 But the choice of icon
also carries a social meaning. By selecting a pair of sunglasses
and referring to them as "shades," the designers send a message
that a user bearing the symbol has something to hide. The icon
sends a message to other users, giving them fair warning that
the individual they are dealing with has changed identities.
insurance program, however, does not aim to prevent fraud (it does not have any
deterrent effect on sellers), but to offer buyers some degree of protection (and thereby
encourage them to buy through eBay).
86 eBay, ID Verify, at http://pages.eBay.com/services/buyandsell/idverify-login.html
(last visited Mar. 29, 2002).
87 eBay, Change User ID, at http://cgi3.eBay.com/aw-
cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?ChangeUserld (last visited Mar. 3, 2002). A user could, of course,
reregister completely as different person as long as they had a new e-mail address and
mailing address.
88 EBay, Change User ID, at http://cgi3.eBay.com/aw-
cgi/eBayISAPI.dll?ChangeUserld (last visited Mar. 3, 2002).
2001-2002
28
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 4 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol4/iss1/2
BUILDING SOCIAL NORMS ON THE INTERNET
eBay has responded to the malleability of identity in
cyberspace not by a code decision that attempts to make
identity change impossible, but by a code decision that attempts
to use informal social mechanisms to control identity change.
The "shades" icon works in two ways. First it carries some kind
of negative social meaning-the wearer is a shady fellow. This
deters the disfavored behavior of ID changing. Second, it works
at a level of indirection, by facilitating norm development.
Under a trust theory of norms, the shades denote
untrustworthiness or, in a McAdams framework, they might
suggest negative esteem. Users will want to avoid changing IDs
unless necessary in order to avoid losing esteem or incurring
potential sanctions against untrustworthy individuals.
The user ID control is one clever use of architecture to
influence behavior. But the most important feature of the eBay
architecture that seeks to control behavior through norms is the
elaborate feedback system. 9 Under the feedback system, once
they have completed a transaction, the buyer and seller can rate
one another.9" When a user receives a positive feedback
comment, she accrues one point; when she receives a negative
feedback comment she loses one point. When users accrue
more than ten points they receive a star icon next to their user
IDs. This icon appears when they are bidding on or selling an
item on the system. Users who accrue even more points get
different colored stars to show that they have been particularly
well received by trading partners." Users may also elect to
allow others to view their feedback profiles. These profiles
include not only the number of points they have accrued, but
89 Most major auction sites, including Yahoo, Excite, and Amazon.com auctions
employ some sort of feedback system similar to the eBay system described here. See,
e.g., Amazon.com, supra note 79; Excite, Excite Auctions, at
http://www.excite.com/?PG home&SEC feat (last visited Apr. 10,2001); Yahoo, supra
note 79.
90 See eBay, The Feedback Forum, at
http://pages.eBay.com/services/forum/feedback.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2002). That is,
you may not give feedback to another user unless you complete a transaction with that
user by placing the winning bid on an item she is selling or receiving the winning bid
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also all the feedback comments made about a user and any
responses to that feedback posted by the user herself. eBay
explains the purpose of the feedback forum in its user
agreement: "Because user authentication on the Internet is
difficult, eBay cannot and does not confirm each user's
purported identity. Thus, we have established a user-initiated
feedback system to help you evaluate with whom you are
dealing. 9 2 The feedback system is an architectural solution to
the inherent problem of anonymity in cyberspace.93 Rather than
using code to address the problem directly, eBay uses code to
facilitate social norms that develop in transactional settings
outside cyberspace.
The feedback system is simply a mechanism for conveying
information about past behavior. Axelrod emphasizes the
importance of knowledge of past behavior. "It is essential that
the players are able to observe and respond to each other's prior
choices. Without this ability to use the past, defections could
not be punished, and the incentive to cooperate would
disappear."94 Axelrod emphasizes the importance of a durable
relationship in which, over time, the players could gather
information about one another. The star system makes that
information more transparent and readily available, and allows
a buyer or seller to gather information about her potential
trading partner from past trading relationships with different
partners.
If you develop a positive reputation within the eBay
community as someone who cooperates in transactions, people
will want to do business with you in the future. In addition,
acquiring a star becomes an independent way to gather esteem.
People will want to cooperate in order to build points in their
feedback accounts. And because unhappy traders can sanction
their partners, users who care about their feedback rating have
92 EBay, User Agreement § 3.2, Safe Trading, at
http://pages.eBay.com/help/community/png-user.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2002).
93 Id.; see also Sirkka L. Jarvenpaa & Emerson H. Tiller, Customer Trust in Virtual
Environments: A Managerial Perspective, 81 B.U. L. REV. 665, 683 (2001) (noting
eBay's use of a reputational system as a control and deterrent device).
9 4 AXELROD, supra note 14, at 182.
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an incentive to cooperate. In addition, individuals who browse
through auctions on the eBay site are likely to see colored stars
(denoting positive feedback received) next to most of the sellers.
Many of the sellers have aqua, purple, or red stars, denoting
over 100, over 500, or over 1000 positive feedback points
respectively.9 5 A user who visits an auction site and is
bombarded by stars receives a message that she has entered a
community where people cooperate in transactions. Just as the
taxpayer who feels that others are paying their taxes and
contributing to a common good will pay her taxes,96 the
potential buyer who sees that others in the community have
played fair and cooperated in other transactions is likely to
reciprocate and play fair when she engages in a transaction
within the community. eBay recognizes the importance of the
community aspect of the feedback by preventing importation of
feedback from other web auction sites.97 By doing this, eBay
isolates its community from other web communities. This
architectural decision may be a double-edged sword, as it may
prevent the formation of wider norms of compliance in online
private transactions, but it also ensures users that reputations,
as expressed in a user's feedback profile, were earned on the
eBay system.
eBay also offers more formal mechanisms, such as an
escrow service, to protect buyers and sellers, but the primary
means of regulation is social. If you defect, you receive negative
feedback. Other users see your negative feedback and may
refuse to trade with you. In addition, eBay suspends users who
95 EBay, The Star Chart, at http://pages.eBay.com/help/myinfo/star-chart.html (last
visited Mar 4, 2002).
96 See Kahan, supra note 23.
97 The User Agreement explains that "[b]ecause feedback ratings are not designed
for any purpose other than for facilitating trading between eBay users, you agree that you
shall not market or export your eBay feedback rating in any venue other than eBay. EBay
User Agreement § 8.1, Export, supra note 92. Similarly, eBay explains, "We do not
provide the technical ability to allow you to import feedback from other websites to eBay
because a composite number, without corresponding feedback does not reflect your true
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reach a feedback rating of negative four," meaning that four
separate transactions have resulted in negative feedback.
Imposing a top- down sanction in those extreme cases where
informal social sanctions fail constitutes a form of rule-based
regulation. I do not intend to suggest that informal social norms
are the only effective means of regulation in cyberspace. Legal
or code-based rules can also be effective. I simply point out
that, rather than use code as law, code designers can foster the
creation of norms that can effectively regulate behavior. The
code does not prevent bad behavior, it merely gives users a way
to create a social system that disfavors it.
Online auctions represent a successful use of code working
at a level of indirection to create necessary conditions for the
evolution of positive social norms. The next Subsection, on
digital music, discusses both the limits of code as a direct means
of control and the seeming intractability of social norms
condoning the widespread copying of copyrighted music and
argues (1) that code solutions, even if they fail to enforce
compliance with copyright rules, may foster the development of
positive social norms, and (2) that this norm of noncompliance
with copyright law may not be as sticky as it might seem.
3. Digital Music and File Sharing
This Subsection explores two norm problems relating to
digital music and file sharing, the first involves the lack of a
norm against illegal file copying, and the second involves the
behavior of individuals who share music online. Both cases
demonstrate how particular design features of code affect norm
development.
The recent litigation over Napster and MP3.com has made
the regulation of digital music a hot topic.99 Napster and other
file sharing services flourished because the architecture of the
Internet and the design of digital music files (as well as most
other file types) permit users to easily copy and distribute the
98 User Agreement § 8, Feedback, supra note 92.
99 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings,
Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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files. Legal disputes arise when people take advantage of the
ease of copying and distribution facilitated by the Internet's
architecture and violate copyright law by giving away copies of
music (or other copyrighted material) without paying royalties.
In physical spaces, of course, architecture does not always
preclude illegal behavior, but it can work in more restrictive
ways than it does in the context of cyberspace. In the physical
record store, architecture makes stealing music difficult but not
impossible. CDs sit in bulky plastic cases, and are often
magnetized to set off a store alarm if taken out the door. Video
cameras may survey aisles. These architectural features of the
store deter criminal activity. Legal enforcement is also a threat.
Laws prohibit shoplifting and the probability of being caught is
very real especially when the architecture includes detectors
and vides cameras. Additionally, norms operate in the physical
world that encourage compliance with the criminal law. People
may refrain from stealing CDs not necessarily because they fear
detection but because they have an internalized sense of right
and wrong that makes them averse to shoplifting.10
In the realm of digital music as currently designed,
architecture has not proven an effective means of regulation.
Nor has the law functioned particularly well. Although
successful lawsuits have been brought against Napster1 °1 and
MP3.com,1 °2 defenders of peer-to-peer networks often point out
how difficult it will be for law to regulate online music sharing.
As Napster lawyer David Boies explained to the New York
Times: "No industry, and no government, can control the
Internet. . . . If the R.I.A.A. succeeds in the U.S., they will
simply drive Napster-like services to other countries. And as
long as services are free to consumers, there is nothing the
100 This is not to say the before the Internet there was no illegal copying of music on
audio cassette recorders. The advent of the Internet and the MP3 file format, however,
made this activity quicker and easier, and the quality of digital copies (unlike audio
cassette copies) does not degenerate with additional copying.
101 Napster, 239 F.3d 1004. On March 2, 2001, Napster announced that it would
change its code to prevent users from sharing certain files named in the copyright law
suit. Matt Richtel, Napster To Start Blocking Access to Protected Music Files, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at Cl.
102 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349.
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R.I.A.A. can do about it." 103 Boies has a point. Because the
Internet crosses national boundaries and because many services
(unlike Napster) have no central control,104 legal regulation may
not adequately control the copying of music files. Though the
law has managed to control Napster, it has not managed to
control the general phenomenon of peer-to-peer file sharing. 105
Commentators debate the effectiveness of using code to
regulate file copying. Lessig has argued that code solutions will
be so effective at protecting intellectual property that the danger
is not widespread copyright violation, but over-protection of
intellectual property. 106  In one sense, Lessig's doomsday
predictions appear to be moving forward. For instance, the
music industry has set up a group, the Secure Digital Music
Initiative, to design a digital watermark to label recordings and
set standards for players to distinguish between legally and
illegally copied material. 107 Others feel that this faith in
technological barriers is misplaced. No sooner had the industry
group posted its standards than a group at Princeton announced
they had broken the code. The leader of the group, Princeton
computer science professor Edward Felten, pointed out the
limits of encryption solutions, telling a reporter, "Right now,
technology is not the answer." 0 '
"' Matthew Mirapaul, Is it Theft or Is it Freedom? 7 Views of the Web's Impact on
Culture Clashes, N.Y. TrMES, Sept. 20, 2000, at 42.
104 Gnutella, Morpheus, and Limewire are all examples of a pure peer-to-peer
sharing system where no information resides on a central system. Users access the system
by connecting to another individual connected to the network. See Gnutella, at
http://www.gnutella.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2002); Limewire, at
http://www.limewire.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2002); Morpheus, at
http://www.morpheus-os.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2002).
105 Napster, 239 F.3d 1004.
106 LESSIG, supra note 2, at 127.
107 RIAA/Music & the Internet, Overview, at http://www.riaa.org/Music-SDMI-
1.cfm (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
108 John Sullivan, Cracking the Code, Musically, N.Y. TrMES, Nov. 5, 2000, at sec.
14NJ, p. 6. Of course, more than code and norms were at stake for Professor Felten. He
and his colleagues were threatened with litigation by the SDMI for violating the anti-
circumvention restrictions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (Supp. V 1999). For a discussion of Felten's case and a critique of the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA, see Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer,
The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1647-49 (2002).
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Programs that circumvent code-based protection systems
are, in fact, quite common. One example that resulted in
litigation is the Streambox VCR program.1"9 The program
allowed users of RealNetworks streaming audio or video to
record the content for later use and to make unauthorized
copies by disabling the Copy Switch, a feature of the
RealNetworks software that controls whether users may
download files and make additional copies of those files."n
RealNetworks was able to shut down Streambox through
litigation,"' but the litigation process is costly and inefficient,
and it would be an uphill battle for a company to win
injunctions against every producer of technical circumventions
and access control devices. 2
Although many will continue to debate the feasibility of
technological solutions, it is likely that, as in the physical
context, architecture can directly regulate behavior in
cyberspace, but that savvy or determined individuals or
enterprises, like Felten or Streambox, will be able to subvert
architectural barriers. Just as a determined burglar could cut
through bars on a window, the determined computer
programmer can break a digital code preventing file copying.
Like bars on window, an encryption regime must be managed
carefully to avoid the problem of architecture working against
the development of positive norms. A "trusted system"1 3 could
send a message of distrust that challenges hackers to break
through the digital wall.
For this reason, focusing on code alone is a mistake.
Effective regulation must instead depend on changing a social
109 RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. 2:99CV02070, 2000 WL 127311
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
"Id. at *4-*5.
111 Id. at *13 (imposing a preliminary injunction on the distribution of Streambox
VCR).
112 Streambox was a commercial enterprise in the United States. The task of finding
every hacker who posts something on the Net or tracking down and suing parties abroad
would be substantially more difficult than bringing suit against Streambox.
113 Trusted systems use encryption to protect data and do not allow the data to
spread to other system unless those systems also enforce the same protections. See Mark
Stefik, Trusted Systems, ScI. AM., Mar. 1997, at 78.
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norm. Currently, a norm exists that accepts the copying of
copyright protected digital files. Some 62 million users opened
accounts with Napster to copy files.114 A roundtable discussion
conducted by the New York Times about file sharing gives a
sampling of public sentiments. One venture capitalist remarked,
"record companies now charge so much ...that people feel
justified in stealing." '115 A teenage consumer took a more fatalist
view: "[T]he technology is way beyond anyone's control. I
won't stop file sharing. If anything, I'm looking forward to
more movies and videos becoming available. The possibilities
are limitless." '116 Or as a Gnutella software developer put it:
"[T]he majority of Americans do not think it is an offense to
trade music online.,
117
Can this norm change? Because of the widespread
distribution of users and the anonymous nature of cyberspace,
some theories of norms would predict that this norm will not
shift easily. There does not seem to be much to gain by
refraining from copying files on the Internet.11 A rhetorical
question posed by Newsweek- "Can 62 million Napster users
really be wrong?"-exemplifies the notion that normatively it is
fine to swap files, even if the courts say otherwise.119
Social meanings, however, are malleable, and for them to
change in the file sharing context the impetus must come from
architectural changes. The debate about the feasibility of code-
based regulation misses the point because a perfect encryption
solution is not necessary. As with eBay, code does not have to
prevent cheating, it just has to foster a norm that discourages
114 See Brad Stone, Good to the Last Drop, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 2001, at 59.
115 Mirapaul, supra note 103.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 For instance, there is not an obvious way for restraint to act as a signaling
mechanism whereby people would demonstrate their commitment to future cooperation.
For one thing, copyright holders and unauthorized copiers are not in a reciprocal
relationship in the same sense as two parties engaging in a commercial relationship. See
supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing Posner's signaling theory of
norms). Nor, in the present context, can an individual gain much esteem from restraining
from illegal copying. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text (discussing
McAdams' esteem theory).
119 Steven Levy, Playing Fair with Copyright, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 2001, at 60.
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cheating. In the file sharing context, the answer may not be
code that allows for signaling, but code that makes file sharing
more difficult. Even if hackers or Princeton professors break
digital watermark technology, many users may not want to use
these anti-encryption programs. Not simply because it is a
hassle to go through the extra step of downloading the hacker
software to break the encryption, but because there is a social
meaning tied in with encryption-the message that it is wrong
to copy the particular file. Even if the tools are readily available
and detection by law enforcement is a remote possibility, when
the rules are apparent, most users will want to play by the rules.
The meaning of downloading the code-breaking software will
be cheating; and by and large people do not want to cheat.
120
Should a norm of compliance with copyright law begin to
develop, implementing widespread encryption controls might
be counterproductive to the maintenance of that norm.
Widespread encryption would send a message to users that
most people were trying to cheat and had to be stopped. This is
not conducive to the development of a network to support a
compliance norm. 
121
The technology employed by RealNetworks (and
circumvented by Streambox VCR) is a good illustration of how
this sort of general norm of compliance could develop. When a
version of the Streambox VCR that bypassed the RealNetworks
Copy Switch was widely available, users may have felt little
120 Just as putting locks on windows can prevent crime (even though locks are not
unbreakable), encryption will prevent illegal copying (even though encryption can be
broken).
121 Cf Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 26 (describing failed deterrence strategies for
tax compliance). The case of music listeners differs, of course, from the earlier example
of the eBay community. On eBay, it is reasonably likely that buyers might become sellers
and vice versa (though a good deal of the sellers on eBay are actually commercial
enterprises). However, it is extremely unlikely that most music listeners will ever be
copyright holders. The better analogy is the taxpayer analogy. Music listeners, like
taxpayers, are unlikely ever to find themselves on the other side (i.e., as copyright holders
or tax collectors). Nevertheless, as has been empirically demonstrated, network norms of
compliance can develop in these situations. See id.
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compulsion not to use it.122 Since the court barred Streambox
from distributing the VCR program in this form,123 copies of the
program have not disappeared. They have, however, become
more difficult to find and install. The whole enterprise has
taken on a clandestine air. 124 The difficulty of obtaining the
bypassing software, along with the fact the most users who do
attempt to download the program will receive a message that
their behavior is in some normative sense "wrong," may deter
individuals from using the circumvention technology. While
some will continue to do so, many will not.
The second norm problem in digital music arises among file
sharers themselves. The system of file sharing requires both a
supply of files and demand for them. Demand is plentiful, 125 but
it turns out that the supply of files may in fact be quite tenuous.
The notion of widespread file sharing (even the use of the word
122 The court case does not actually state how widespread the use of the program
was, nor does any data seem to be easily available to ascertain how many users actually
took advantage of the product.
123 Obviously, the presence of copyright law (in particular the DMCA) was
necessary to shut down Streambox VCR. Although I have paid little attention to the role
of law (or the role of the market), nothing in my argument should be taken to suggest that
law does not have a role to play. Legal protections are, of course, terribly important. I
will only go so far as to echo Lessig's argument that law cannot be expected to bear the
burden of regulation alone. See LESSIG, supra note 2.
124 For example, users may download the current version of Streambox VCR (which
does not include the ability to bypass the copy protection features) and then download a
software patch restoring the VCR to its former glory. Even where this is available on the
web, however, no user could engage in the operation without some sense of
nefariousness. Witness the text on a site that provides the software:
Although using StreamBox VCR is easy, finding it on the
Internet for download is not. Moreover, the current version of
StreamBox VCR (1.0 beta 3.1) requires one to register the program,
and it "phones home" everytime you queue a file for downloading.
To avoid these misfortunes, one should apply the crack that has been
developed.
Afterdawn.com, Unofficial Manual for Streambox VCR 1.0 beta 3.1, at
http://www.afterdawn.com/articles/archive/streambox vcr guide.cfm (last updated Apr.
12, 2002). The site goes on to warn potential users that "Streambox had legal difficulties
with RealNetworks" and that "U.S. users should not download this program!" (though the
site does nothing to stop them and is written in English). Afterdawn.com, Streambox
VCR 1.0 beta 3.1, at
http://www.afterdawn.com/software/video software/video tools/streambox vcr.cfm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2002).
125 At its peak Napster had 62 million users. Levy, supra note 119.
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"sharing" as opposed to "copying") leads to a sense that
everyone engaged in the practice is contributing to some
common enterprise. A recent study, however, by two
researchers at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC)
dispels this last notion. The research reexamines distributed file
sharing systems such as Gnutella and FreeNet. The authors,
Eytan Adar and Bernardo A. Huberman want to shift the
discussion from copyright compliance to cooperation among
the file-sharers themselves. They write:
While a lot of attention has been focused on
the issue of free access to music and the violation
of copyright laws through these systems, there
remains an additional problem of securing
enough cooperation in such large and
anonymous systems so they become truly useful.
Since users are not monitored as to who makes
their files available to the rest of the network...
or downloads remote files . . . the possibility
exists that as the user community in such
networks gets large, users will stop producing and
only consume. This free riding behavior is the
result of a social dilemma that all users of such
systems confront, even though they may not be
aware of its existence.
126
The authors conducted an empirical study of Gnutella, a
distributed file sharing service. 127 The study found that 69% of
users share no files; they only download files. 12' The burden of
actually hosting files for distribution fell predominately on a
small percent of the users. The top 1% of hosts (in terms of
126 Eytan Adar & Bemardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, Internet
Ecologies Area, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center,
http://www.firstmonday.dlc/issues/issues 10/adar (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
127 Unlike Napster, Gnutella and other decentralized peer-to-peer services do not
rely on any central server. All files and file information resides on individual users'
computers.
128 Adar & Humberman, supra note 126.
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number of downloads) shared 37% of the total files shared. 129
The top 20% of hosts in terms of volume share 98% of the total
files shared.13 °
The authors have identified a potential tragedy of the
commons. The classic tragedy of the commons argument
focuses on the idea of free riders over-consuming an exhaustible
resource.131 Individuals may not exhaust digital files themselves
in the same manner as physical resources, because digital files
are infinitely reproducible. The authors point instead to
bandwidth constraints as the exhaustible resource. Only a fixed
number of users may connect at any given time to any given
host. If the number of hosts making files available is small, only
a small number of users will be able to access the files. 13 2 The
authors predict that a tragedy of the digital commons awaits.133
The results of the study dispel another myth-the idea that
because services like Gnutella operate with no central
authority, they are beyond the reach of legal enforcement.
While it might be infeasible for a copyright holder to sue the
33,335 users on the system during the study's test period,134 it
would be significantly easier to sue the 333 top hosts who
provide over a third of all the downloads. Gnutella, the authors
argue, provides a false sense of security.
135
The study raises a particular question: Why do some
users continue to contribute to the common good? Although
the files offered by hosts are not affected by the copying, hosts
do incur a bandwidth cost by allowing users to connect to their
computers. One answer may be that hosts believe that others on
the system cooperate. Research has shown in other contexts
that individuals cooperate in collective action settings when
they trust others are cooperating.136 If a Gnutella user believes
129 Id. The top 1% represents 333 hosts.
130 Id. The top 20% represent 6,667 hosts.
131 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).




136 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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that others are cooperating by hosting files, that user is more
likely to become a host herself. If, however, the fact that few
actually do cooperate becomes widespread knowledge, it is
likely that users will begin to defect. As Dan Kahan argues:
[B]ecause individuals are reciprocators, their
inclination to contribute to public goods depends
in a large measure on the inclination of other
individuals to do the same and thus grows
stronger or weaker as they observe others
contributing or not. . . . [C]ollective behavior is
susceptible to multiple, self-sustaining equilibria
depending on the beliefs individuals form about
the likely behavior of others.137
This line of research suggests that the norm of cooperative
file sharing may be far more precarious than generally thought.
III. CONCLUSION
In the physical world, law, markets, norms, and
architecture all interact to regulate human behavior. The same
is true of cyberspace. Because of the particular difficulties of
law enforcement in cyberspace, the possibility of regulating
cyberspace predominately through law is limited. Since
cyberspace is an entirely "built" environment, the computer
code that defines it seems like a likely way to control the
activities of those on Internet. However, although code is a
powerful tool, it cannot carry the regulatory burden alone. In
some cases, design decisions in code can be circumvented (just
as physical architectural barriers can be broken through); in
other cases, code is simply not the most effective way of
fostering productive behavior.
As we have seen, software engineers can and do become
norm entrepreneurs138 by writing code that allows for and
fosters the development of productive social norms. Those who
137 Kahan, supra note 23, at 339.
131 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 909, 929 (describing "norm entrepreneurs" as
people who are able to change norms).
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write code and those who seek to regulate it should recognize
this power. At the same time, code writers must remember that
just as the rules they create through code will define an
allowable set of behavior, the design will encourage the
development of certain social norms. By combining rules
written into computer code and design strategies calculated to
promote good behavior, and by paying heed to the complex
relationship between architecture and norms, software
architects will be able to guide the development of productive
social norms in cyberspace.
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